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Jurisdictions and causes of action: Commercial 
considerations in dealing with bullying, stress and 
harassment cases—Part I 
  Niall Neligan B.L.  
This is the first of a two part article in which the author will 
critically evaluate the different causes of action and myriad of 
jurisdictions for bringing a claim in the inter-related fields of 
bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace from a commercial 
law perspective. The author will define and trace the separate 
headings under which the law governing bullying, stress and 
harassment has evolved. In the second part of the article (which will 
appear in the next edition of the journal), the author will examine 
recent developments in tortious claims for psychiatric injuries 
arising from bullying, stress and harassment cases, and raise the 
question whether it would be more appropriate to streamline and 
codify this area of law in order to provide greater clarity to potential 
litigants and employers, and reduce the number of jurisdictions in 
which claims are brought. 
Introduction 
That nature abhors a vacuum is an oft-used cliché but one certainly 
worth considering in any clinical examination of the myriad of laws 
that encompass the present regime for dealing with cases concerning 
bullying, harassment and stress in the workplace. What is clear from 
a cursory examination of the law presently is that the current 
multiplicity of jurisdictions and cause of actions is unsustainable in 
the long term, and in my opinion serves no-one's interest, be it client, 
lawyer, tribunal or court. 
Curiously, the inter-relationship between bullying, stress and 
harassment is often overlooked by jurists and legislators and as such 
they have in the past been classified independently. However, the 
lines of demarcation between bullying, stress and harassment in the 
workplace are far more nebulous; indeed, in many cases they are 
symbiotic in so far that harassment is a form of bullying and stress 
the result of such behaviour. In a recent report on Bullying in the 
Workplace carried out by the ESRI on behalf of the Department of 
Enterprise Trade and Employment, 43 per cent of respondents 
surveyed, who were the victims of bullying in the workplace, 
suffered from stress.1 The reductive approach taken in the past by 
jurists and legislators towards bullying, stress and harassment in the 
workplace has resulted in a patchwork approach to this important 
area of law, hence the unsatisfactory situation where there are 
overlapping causes of action and multiple jurisdictions. 
This lack of clarity is a cause of concern for prospective litigants, be 
they employers or employees, but more particularly for the 
practitioner as illustrated by a case involving alleged bullying, 
leading to a stress induced injury whereby the victim is forced to 
resign from their work position. This poses the potential problem: 
should the practitioner recommend the victim bring a case for 
constructive dismissal under the statutory regime for unfair 
dismissals (thus limiting their remedies and compensation), or 
gamble and bring a case for wrongful dismissal where it arises, thus 
exposing the client to serious loss if he or she fails in their action 
before the courts?2 A victim who has suffered a stress induced injury 
can initiate a claim for constructive dismissal under the Unfair 
Dismissals Acts as well as a separate claim for personal injuries 
before the Personal Injuries Assessment Board. However, this places 
the victim in the unenviable position of having to initiate two 
separate claims in two separate jurisdictions. 
From a commercial, and indeed an employer's perspective, the 
growth in cases involving bullying, stress and harassment present 
real challenges to the running of commercial and public 
undertakings, particularly in terms of organisational and 
management culture. Increasingly, commercial and public 
undertakings are diverting resources to meet such challenges ranging 
from employee awareness programmes and management retraining 
to re-writing health and safety statements. However, in the absence 
of clarity in the law, employers often find themselves fighting 
rearguard actions in trying to reconcile pressurised work 
environments with complex and opaque legal rules. 
One solution which has been mooted in respect of the above 
problem is the introduction of comprehensive legislation along the 
lines of the once proposed Dignity at Work Bill , introduced in 2001 
by Baroness Gibson before the House of Lords.3 As to whether 
legislation in itself would be appropriate in drawing together the 
strands of bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace is in 
itself a matter for debate. Nevertheless, the vacuous condition of the 
present state of the law is a cause for concern for reasons which I 
have set out below.4 
 
Nature of bullying 
As aforementioned, bullying is a nebulous concept with many guises 
and can include: 
“constantly criticising, belittling, degrading, shouting at, 
humiliating, overworking, denying job information, singling out for 
unfavourable treatment, threatening, ostracizing, trivial-fault finding, 
applying unrealistic deadlines, assaulting and ridiculing”.5 
Middlemiss and Hay in their 2003 research observed: 
“[that] where such bullying or intimidating actions are perpetrated 
by supervisory employees against other employees in the workplace, 
it is often symptomatic of a poor organisational culture, which 
perpetrates or condones such behaviour.” 
 
Prevalence of bullying in the workplace 
Arising out of research carried out by the ERSI on behalf of the 
Taskforce on the Prevention of Workplace Bullying, about 7.9 per 
cent of the Irish workforce recorded themselves as having been 
bullied in the six months preceding the survey.6 The rate of 
victimisation is approximately 1.8 times greater among women than 
it is for men. Interestingly, the level of workplace bullying rose 
substantially with increases in the level of educational attainment. 
Indeed, men who left education on completion of third level have a 
55 per cent higher chance of being bullied than their counterparts 
who left education with a junior / leaving certificate or less. The 
highest risk of bullying was found in the education (14%), public 
administration (13.3%) and health (13 %) sectors. However, in the 
private sector there are high incidences of bullying in financial 
services (8%), IT (9%) and wholesale / retail (10.9%).7 
 
The impact of bullying, stress and harassment cases 
In terms of the victim, bullying can have serious ramifications on a 
personal and professional level to the point where it can destroy a 
person's mental health irrespective of the other losses which may be 
incurred such as loss of occupation and financial loss. For an 
employer it may result in a loss of productivity, absenteeism, 
workplace disruption, staff discontent and possible litigation, both in 
the civil and criminal courts. Aside from these considerations, 
employers will also have to cover the cost of having to investigate 
and respond to complaints by employees and the need to sometimes 
remove or suspend an accused employee from the workplace; not to 
mention the cost of having to find a temporary replacement for both 
the perpetrator and the victim who may or may not be on sick leave. 
As observed by Middlemiss and Hay8 : 
“Victims of bullying will want bullying to come to an end but are 
often powerless to stop it. Grievance procedures, normally invoked 
to deal with internal complaints of employees, can be ineffectual for 
dealing with claims of bullying”. 
Middlemiss and Hay further note that: 
“This is particularly true where the first stage of complaint for the 
employee is to raise the matter with their line-manager and it is his 
or her behaviour that is the subject of the complaint.” 
Workplace bullying and harassment may arise in a variety of 
different ways. It may be group-oriented (sometimes referred to as 
mobbing), peer-related, hierarchical or involve subordinates. 
Periodically, bullying behaviour can extend outside work hours and 
include individuals who are not under the direct control of the 
employer but who are to some degree associated with the employees 
who are perpetrating the behavior against the victim in the 
workplace. 
In general terms it is assumed by workplace psychologists that all 
employees will have been a victim of moderate or immoderate 
bullying at some point in their career, whether overt or covert. The 
degree of harm caused by bullying will depend on the nature and 
effect which it has on the individual, so that some employees will 
not manifest signs of bullying, while others clearly will. 
 
Legal environment 
From a preliminary examination of the law, there is no one statute 
dealing with bullying in the workplace. There is however, a variety 
of causes of action under which a bullying claim may be brought 
against an employer. From an employer's perspective, he or she will 
need to be familiar with the different laws and venues where a 
bullying claim may be brought. Typically, a plaintiff in a bullying 
case can rely on the following causes of action: breach of contract, 
the tort of negligence, unfair dismissals, health and safety, and 
equality law. 
The law on bullying in the workplace is in a constant state of 
evolution and nowhere is this more evident than in the tort of 
negligence. It has long been established that employers owe a duty 
to take reasonable care for the safety of their employees at work 
whether expressed in the contract of employment or implied by 
common law. Up until the mid-1990s this duty almost exclusively 
concerned physical injuries sustained in the workplace. However, 
over the past 12 years, since the seminal decision of the House of 
Lords in Walker v Northumberland County Council , the law both in 
the UK and Ireland has evolved to include a duty to take reasonable 
care for employee safety from mental, psychological or psychiatric 
injuries that emanate from workplace stress, harassment and 
bullying.9 
 
 
Defining the issues 
In order to have a fuller understanding of how the courts deal with 
these complex issues, it is necessary at the offset to define what is 
meant by bullying, stress and harassment from a legal perspective.10 
 
 
Bullying 
There is no statutory definition of bullying; however, The Report of 
the Expert Advisory Group on Workplace Bullying defines it in the 
following way: 
“Workplace Bullying is repeated inappropriate behaviour direct or 
indirect whether verbal, physical or otherwise, conducted by one or 
more persons against one another or others, at the place of work and 
/ or in the course of employment, which could be reasonably 
regarded as undermining the individual's right to dignity at work. An 
isolated incident of the behaviour described in this definition may be 
an affront to dignity at work but as a once off incident is not 
considered to be bullying.” 
The expert advisory group commented that the definition of bullying 
is in a state of evolution. Examples of the type of bullying behaviour 
envisaged in the report include the following: 
〇. •  undermining an individual's right to dignity at work; 
. •  humiliation; 
. •  intimidation; 
. •  verbal abuse; 
. •  victimisation; 
. •  mobbing; 
. •  exclusion and isolation; 
. •  intrusion by pestering, spying and stalking; 
. •  repeated unreasonable assignments to duties which are 
obviously unfavourable to one individual; 
. •  repeated requests giving impossible deadlines or impossible 
tasks; and 
. •  implied threats.11  
Some commentators have noted that bullying of course is an entirely 
subjective experience. Some employers may not be aware that they 
are engaging in bullying behaviour—this can arise for example 
where an employer/employee is over assertive and does not realise 
there is a fine line between being assertive and being a bully. It is of 
course entirely possible that the victim likewise does not realise that 
he or she is being subjected to what amounts to bullying behaviour. 
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse and the courts have 
demonstrated a willingness to act sternly with an employer who has 
engaged in unacceptable behaviour towards an employee. 
 
 
Workplace stress 
As in the case of bullying, there is no statutory definition for work-
related stress. Guidance, however, has been sought from both 
government and nongovernmental agencies. In 2000, the European 
Commission carried out significant work in the area of work-related 
stress, publishing a comprehensive document "Guidance on Work-
related Stress”. This document provided guidance and general 
information on the causes, manifestations and consequences of 
work-related stress, both for employees and employers. Within the 
document, the Commission defined workplace stress in the 
following circumstances: 
“The emotional, cognitive, behavioural and physiological reaction to 
aversive and noxious aspects of work, work environments and work 
organisations. It is characterised by high levels of arousal and 
distress and often by feelings of not coping.” 
In the absence of statutory definitions both the tribunals and courts 
have had to develop their own versions of what amounts to work-
related stress, relying initially on UK case decisions before 
developing their own jurisprudence. 
 
 
Harassment 
Unlike bullying and work-related stress, harassment is defined under 
statute—Irish law having followed American jurisprudence by 
adopting a discrimination-based approach to harassment. The 
Employment Equality Act 1998 prohibited harassment and defined it 
as occurring where one person was less favorably treated than 
another on any of nine separate grounds: 
 . 1.  Gender. 
 . 2.  Marital status. 
 . 3.  Family status. 
 . 4.  Sexual orientation. 
 . 5.  Religion. 
 . 6.  Age. 
 . 7.  Disability. 
 . 8.  Race, that is discrimination on grounds of an individual's race, 
colour, nationality or ethnic or national origin. 
 . 9.  Membership of the travelling community. 
The concept of harassment was broadened in the Equality Act 2004 
and now reads as follows: 
 
 
Section 14 (A) of the Equality Acts 1998–2004 
“(a) an employee (in this section referred to as ‘the victim’) is 
harassed or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is 
employed (in this section referred to as ‘the workplace’) or 
otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who 
is— 
 . (i)  employed at that place or by the same employer, 
 . (ii)  the victim's employer, or 
 . (iii)  a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's 
employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such 
that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to 
prevent it, […].” 
 
 Causes of action 
Having defined the issues it is now necessary to consider the 
different headings under which actions for bullying, stress and 
harassment are brought: 
 . •  Breach of express and implied duties under the contract of 
employment. 
 . •  Harassment—Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004 . 
 . •  Harassment under criminal and employment law. 
 . •  Breach of contract—Wrongful dismissal. 
 . •  Constructive dismissal—Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2005 . 
 . •  Constructive dismissal—Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004 
. 
 . •  Section 9 application pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 
1969 . 
 . •  Tortious claims for psychiatric injuries arising from bullying and 
stress cases. 
 . •  Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 . 
 
Breach of contract 
Bullying claims can result a breach of the terms of the contract 
whether this arises under express or implied terms. Again it has been 
noted by Middlemiss and Hay: 
“[that] … Employers are unlikely to offer protection against bullying 
to employees in the form of a written or oral express term in an 
employment contract. In the event that an employer introduces a 
policy for bullying or dignity at work and it is incorporated into 
employees’ contracts of employment, then an express contractual 
right to be protected against bullying would be provided. An action 
for breach of a contract will otherwise only be available to a victim 
of workplace bullying where it represents a breach of an implied 
term of his contract.”12 
Having considered a variety of authorities before the courts in the 
United Kingdom, the authors formed the opinion: 
“[that] … Where an employer breaches its implied duty, this can 
represent repudiation by him of an employee's contract of 
employment and provide the basis for an action against him by the 
employee for breach of his contract. The most important of the 
implied terms is the mutual duty to maintain trust and confidence. 
This term and the term that places a duty on the employer to provide 
for the safety of his employees are the most relevant to bullying.”13 
O’ Connell in her article on Bullying in the Workplace notes that a 
breach of contract may occur where the employer failed to comply 
with fair procedures most notably in dealing with accusations of 
bullying; in which case it is possible for both the victim and the 
alleged perpetrator to initiate a claim. She further notes that cases 
have arisen in the past where perpetrators of bullying have sought 
injunctions claiming fair procedures have not been followed, even in 
circumstances where it had been shown the perpetrators were 
actively involved in bullying fellow employees.14 
A consideration of what is fair will depend largely on the facts of 
each individual case; the presence or absence of either grievance or 
disciplinary procedures will be a critical factor the court or tribunal 
will take into account in arriving at a decision. 
 
 
Breach of express and implied duties under the contract of 
employment 
Under a contract of employment, whether expressed or implied, an 
employee will owe several duties to an employer, including but not 
limited to: 
 . 1.  Honesty. 
 . 2.  Loyalty. 
 . 3.  A duty not to act contrary to the employer's interests. 
Correspondingly, an employer owes duties to an employee whether 
expressed in the contract or implied by law, including but not limited 
to: 
 . 1.  Duty of employer to maintain his employee's trust and 
confidence. 
 . 2.  Employer's duty to take reasonable care for the safety of his 
employees. 
 . 3.  The duty to provide a safe system of work. 
 . 4.  A duty to ensure compliance and enforcement of reasonable 
rules of conduct. 
 . 5.  A duty to provide a workplace that is free from harassment. 
 . 6.  A duty to ensure that employees are free to carry out their work 
free from harassment. 
Of those employer's duties mentioned above perhaps the most 
important for the purpose of this article are the duties: to maintain an 
employee's trust and confidence, to take reasonable care for their 
safety and to provide a workplace free from harassment. 
 
 
(1) Duty of employer to maintain his employee's trust and confidence 
in the employment relationship 
In recent years the courts, both in the UK and Ireland, have 
demonstrated a willingness to recognise an implied duty placed on 
the employer to maintain his employee's trust and confidence. This 
duty is not a mutually exclusive obligation, and it applies in a 
situation where an employee acting in a supervisory capacity 
engages in bullying of a subordinate employee, resulting in an 
overall breach of the employer's duty. 
The application of the implied duty of trust and confidence to 
situations involving bullying represents a novel departure by the 
courts and a far remove from the concept originally conceived by the 
House of Lords in the case of Malik v BCCI .15 In this case the House 
of Lords held that: 
“Subject to issues of causation, mitigation and remoteness, an 
employee might in principle recover damages for financial loss 
stemming from a loss of reputation caused by breach of the 
employer's implied obligation not, without reasonable and proper 
cause, to conduct itself in a manner likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer 
and employee.”16 
The court noted that an employment contract creates a close personal 
relationship where there is often a disparity of power between the 
parties. The court observed that employers should not damage their 
employees’ future employment prospects by harsh and oppressive 
behaviour, or by any other conduct which falls below the standards 
set by the implied duty of trust and confidence. Of critical 
importance here is the use by Lord Nichols of the expression “any 
other conduct” which has evolved over time to embrace conduct of a 
bullying nature. 
Nevertheless, the expansion of the implied duty of trust and 
confidence since Malik has not been without reservation, a point 
which can be gleaned from the decision of the House of Lords in the 
case Johnson v Unisys Ltd ,17 where the court tried to place some 
limits on the evolution of the principle developing to “reflect modern 
perceptions of how employees should be treated fairly and with 
dignity”. Indeed, when the Johnson case was before the Court of 
Appeal, the court citing an earlier decision in Addis v Gramaphone 
Company Ltd , did not accept that the Malik principle allowed 
damages for the manner in which a dismissal took place. In Johnson 
, the plaintiff sought compensation for wrongful dismissal alleging 
he suffered a major psychiatric illness from the manner of his 
dismissal and the circumstances leading up to it. He claimed 
financial loss of £400,000 due to this mental breakdown and his 
consequent inability to find employment.18 
There is concern that the scope of the implied duty of trust and 
confidence is so wide that it could embrace a situation such as the 
imposition of an intolerable workload—something which has 
traditionally fallen within the remit of constructive dismissal.19 
Certainly, there is an ongoing debate in academic circles that, 
notwithstanding the Johnson decision, the implied duty of mutual 
trust and confidence will evolve to form an all-embracing super-
principle under which each of the more “traditional” implied duties 
will rest; although this point has been discounted by many 
commentators.20 
In this jurisdiction the High Court recently considered the nature and 
scope of the implied duty of trust and confidence in a variety of 
cases, most interestingly in the decision of Berber v Dunnes Stores. 
21
 In the context of the implied duty of trust and confidence, Laffoy 
J. in the High Court held that the defendant was in breach of the 
implied duty in circumstances where the defendant had known of the 
precarious nature of the plaintiff's physical and psychological health 
and that this amounted to oppressive conduct which seriously 
damaged the relationship between the parties. 
A breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence was also 
considered in the High Court in the case of Pickering v Microsoft 
Ireland Operations Limited 22 where the plaintiff, who did not have a 
written contract, brought an action for wrongful dismissal, 
submitting that in addition to the implied duty of trust and 
confidence there was a second implied term in the contract that 
required or obliged her employer not to expose her to a risk of 
personal injury.23 
One of the issues raised in Pickering was whether the plaintiff could 
avoid the restrictive principle set down in Addis v Gramaphone 
Company that where a servant is dismissed from his employment the 
damages for the dismissal cannot include compensation for the 
manner of his dismissal, for injured feelings or from the loss he may 
sustain from the fact the dismissal makes it more difficult for him to 
obtain fresh employment.24 
In Pickering , Smith J. considered the restrictive principle in 
Johnson 25 and how it was assessed in an earlier judgment of Laffoy 
J. in McGrath v Trinitech .26 In particular, the judge referred to the 
defendant's submission that: (a) the plaintiff had no right to claim 
any remedy, apart from damages at common law, and that these 
damages do not include damages for the manner of the plaintiff's 
dismissal; (b) whether the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence can be relied on, if it is inconsistent with an express term 
in a contract of employment; and (c) the legal position in relation to 
an employer's liability for psychiatric injury induced by stress and 
pressure at work. 
Smith J. considered the proposition that an implied term must be 
consistent with an express term (in this case the express term being 
the right of the employer under the common law to terminate the 
contract of employment, the remedy for this breach of contract being 
no more than the remuneration which should have been paid during 
the notice period). It was concluded that the common law position in 
relation to dismissal had not changed and therefore an implied term 
of trust and confidence could not be relied on to circumvent that 
principle. However, the court having discounted that point, 
considered the implied duty of trust and confidence independent of 
and unconnected with the manner of the plaintiff's dismissal; namely 
in the context in which the defendant had given expressed 
assurances that the plaintiff would be involved in the resolution of 
any difficulties arising from the implementation of the re-
organisation plan. The court was satisfied that this term had been 
breached which amounted to constructive dismissal entitling the 
plaintiff to treat the contract as repudiated. 
It would appear from the above decisions that the High Court has 
recognised the existence of the implied duty of trust and confidence 
in this jurisdiction; however, it would also appear that the court, at 
least in Pickering , is prepared to limit the scope of its application. 
 
 
(2) Employer's duty to take reasonable care for the safety of his 
employees 
It is long established under the law governing contracts of 
employment that in the absence of an expressed term there is an 
implied duty placed on the employer to take reasonable care for the 
safety of all his employees. However, this duty under contract is 
mirrored in the law of torts where a general duty of care exists; 
therefore a prospective litigant can sue under different headings. 
Since the seminal case of Walker v Northumberland County Council 
it has been accepted that a breach of a general duty of care could 
take place, where it is established that an employer, in this case a 
local authority, subjected an employee to unacceptable levels of 
stress, caused by a health endangering workload.27 The ambit of this 
duty is wide enough to apply to cases of bullying where it is 
incumbent on an employer to provide a safe working environment. 
In Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority , the plaintiff was 
employed as a senior house officer by a hospital authority. His 
standard working week was 40 hours; however, he was required to 
make himself available for an additional 48 hours on call. In certain 
weeks he worked in excess of 88 hours and this over a period of time 
adversely affected his health. Stuart-Smith L.J. in his judgment 
noted: 
“There is no difference between the duty to provide a safe system of 
working and the duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the 
employee. The former is merely an ingredient in the latter duty…. It 
must be remembered that the duty of care is owed to the individual 
employee and different employees may have different stamina. If the 
defendants in this case knew or ought to have known that by 
requiring him to work the hours they did, they exposed him to risk of 
injury to his health, then they should not have required him to work 
in excess of those hours that he safely could have done”. 
The court concluded that the defendants were in breach of an 
implied duty of care in that they should not have required the 
plaintiff to work so far in excess of his standard working week. 
Indeed, it would have been reasonably foreseeable that to do so 
would have injured the plaintiff's health. 
Recently, the High Court considered the scope of duty in this 
jurisdiction both in McGrath and Pickering , the subject of which 
will be discussed in greater detail later in this article. 
 
 
(3) Common law duty on an employer to provide a workplace that is 
free from harassment 
Even before the introduction of the Employment Equality Acts 
1998-2004 , there was an implied duty on an employer to provide a 
workplace free from harassment; the Labour Court having 
recognised that harassment was a form of discrimination as far back 
as 1985 in A Worker v A Garage Proprietor .28 The common law 
duty has been somewhat superseded in recent years by the placing of 
harassment (including sexual harassment) on a statutory footing. It is 
within this context that harassment must now be examined. 
As mentioned above, s. 14(A) inserts a new provision into the 
Employment Equality Acts dealing with harassment and sexual 
harassment, extending it in relation to gender, marital status, family 
status, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, race or 
membership of the travelling community.29 This provision provides 
that an employee is harassed or sexually harassed either at the place 
where he or she is employed or otherwise in the course of his or her 
employment. Proving harassment depends on showing that the 
victim and the other individual are both employed at that place or by 
the same employer; the other individual is the victim's employer; or 
the other individual is a client, customer or other business contact of 
the victim's employer and the circumstances of the harassment are 
such that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to 
prevent it. The provision goes on to read: 
“…or the victim is treated differently in the workplace 
(victimisation—harassment) or otherwise in the course of his or her 
employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or it 
could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated.” 
It is clear from the wording of the provision that harassment is a 
form of bullying especially where victimisation is present. 
Under Art. 11 of the Equal Treatment Directive, Member States 
were obliged to introduce measures dealing with victimisation in 
their respective legislation.30 The concept of victimisation was 
incorporated into the Employment Equality Act 1998 and occurs 
where the dismissal or other penalisation of the complainant was 
solely or mainly occasioned by the complainant having, in good 
faith sought redress under the Acts.31 In the case of Jacqui McCarthy 
v Dublin Corporation , the claimant succeeded in her action against 
the respondent who was held to be vicariously liable for the actions 
of its employees who victimised the claimant for having previously 
brought a claim under equality legislation.32 The provision dealing 
with vicarious liability is set out under s. 15(1) of the Act, however, 
an employer can escape liability in respect of an alleged act of 
harassment or victimisation (carried out by subordinates) if he can 
demonstrate that he or she took such reasonable steps as were 
practicable to prevent the perpetrator (a) from doing that act, or (b) 
from doing, in the course of his or her employment, acts of that 
description.33 
One of the major considerations which an employer must have in 
relation to a potential claim for harassment under the Equality Acts 
is that scope for compensation is much greater than that provided for 
under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-1993 .34 This can be seen 
from the Atkinson decision in which Delahunt J. awarded a claimant 
the sum of €137,000 less 25 per cent for contributory negligence on 
account of the plaintiff being aware for a two-year-period prior to 
making a complaint that she was sexually harassed.35 
 
 
Criminal law 
Harassment must also be understood within its criminal law context 
under the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 .36 The 
breadth of this provision is sufficiently wide to encompass situations 
that can arise within a working environment; however, the behavior 
in question would have to be very serious before the authorities 
intervene. In 1997, Parliament in the UK introduced the Protection 
Against Harassment Act, a legislative response to the public order 
offence of stalking (although the act itself is not confined to that 
particular offence). The Protection Against Harassment Act creates 
not just a criminal offence for harassment but also provides a 
complainant with a civil remedy. The extent of the vicarious liability 
of the employer in this context was recently considered in the case of 
Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust. 37 
In Majrowski , the claimant, a homosexual male, brought an action 
against his employer for breach of statutory duty, claiming that he 
had been unlawfully harassed by a female manager in breach of s. 1 
of the Act, maintaining that the employer was vicariously liable.38 
The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
dismissing the employer's contention that the Act did not provide for 
the vicarious liability of the employer.39 In particular, and of 
relevance to this article, Nicholl L.J. noted: 
“I am at a loss to see why these particular features of this newly 
created wrong should be thought to place this wrong in a special 
category in which an employer is exempt from vicarious liability. It 
is true that this new wrong usually comprises conduct of an intensely 
personal character between two individuals. But this feature may 
also be present with other wrongs which attract vicarious liability, 
such as assault. Nor does imposition of criminal liability only on the 
perpetrator of the wrong, and on a person who aids, abets, counsels 
or procures the harassing conduct, point to a different conclusion. 
Conversion, assault and battery may attract criminal liability as well 
as civil liability, but this does not exclude vicarious liability.” 
 
 
Breach of contract—Wrongful dismissal 
Under contract law, an employee can bring an action for wrongful 
dismissal where, for example, he or she has brought to the 
employer's attention instances of bullying or harassment, a result of 
which leads to the victim being dismissed. Consequently, the 
employee can initiate a claim in either the Circuit Court or indeed 
the High Court for damages.40 The nature of the wrongful dismissal 
action will depend on whether the employee was dismissed without 
proper notice,41 or as the case may be, the employee was dismissed 
summarily.42 Depending on the circumstances of the case the 
employee has an option of either pursuing a claim for wrongful 
dismissal in the courts or bringing a case for unfair dismissal before 
the Employment Appeals Tribunal.43 
The nature of a wrongful dismissal action was considered in the case 
of Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd , in which McLaughlin J. in 
the Canadian Supreme Court stated: 
“… ‘wrongful dismissal’ action is not concerned with the wrongness 
or rightness of the dismissal itself. Far from making dismissal a 
wrong, the law entitles both employer and employee to terminate the 
employment relationship without cause. A wrong arises only if the 
employer breaches the contract by failing to give the dismissed 
employee reasonable notice of termination. The remedy for this 
breach of contract is an award of damages based on the period of 
notice which should have been given.” 
Whereas claims for wrongful dismissal are limited if taken within 
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the same cannot be said for 
claims taken within the jurisdiction of the High Court. However, 
typically the award is normally concerned with compensating the 
plaintiff for inadequate notice and the amount of damages will often 
be limited to the wages due under the notice period. 
 
 
Constructive dismissal 
Perhaps the most recognisable avenue for seeking redress for actions 
amounting to bullying in the workplace is where the employee 
resigns from the position of employment and brings an action for 
constructive dismissal or discharge by breach as it was originally 
referred to.44 However, this is perhaps the riskiest course of action a 
potential litigant may take; s.1 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-
2005 defines constructive dismissal as: 
“The termination by the employee of his contract of employment 
with his employer whether prior notice of the termination was or 
was not given to the employer in circumstances in which, because of 
the conduct of the employer the employee was or would have been 
entitled or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee to 
terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of 
the termination to the employer.”45 
It should be noted that a claim for constructive dismissal is not 
limited to the Unfair Dismissals legislation; an action may be 
brought under s.2 of the Equality Acts 1998-2004 which includes 
constructive dismissal within the definition of dismissal.46 Such a 
claim can be pursued before the Equality Tribunal, or in the case of 
gender discrimination, to the Circuit Court. As mentioned above, in 
the context of harassment the Tribunal not only has the power to 
award compensation, re-instatement or re-engagement, but 
accordingly may also award damages. Not surprisingly, the equality 
route for dismissal is becoming increasingly popular particularly 
among non-nationals who are the victims of bullying in the 
workplace.47 
One of the quintessential problems with any case for constructive 
dismissal is whether the employee left his employment too soon or 
correspondingly too late.48 It is of course possible for an employee to 
leave on account of one act of bullying, provided the behaviour was 
particularly serious. In respect of a situation where an employee is 
exposed to unacceptable behaviour over a period of time, the 
tribunal will consider whether the complainant made use of the 
grievance procedure; the nature of that procedure; whether the rules 
applying to that procedure were followed or ignored, and 
furthermore who was the person(s) to whom the employee 
complained—was the referee impartial and removed from both the 
complainant and the perpetrator(s)?49 The Tribunal has made it quite 
clear that in order to succeed “the complainant must demonstrate, 
and the tribunal must find as a matter of fact, that the financial loss 
is attributable to the dismissal”. Perhaps the most high profile case 
involving bullying and constructive dismissal in recent years was the 
case of Liz Allen v Independent Newspapers where the complainant 
was awarded the sum of £70,500 or 78 weeks pay.50 
Traditionally, for a constructive dismissal action to succeed the 
plaintiff had to make a complaint; however, there is now authority 
that in a limited number of circumstances an employee may not have 
to if the person they should complain to is in fact the perpetrator of 
the alleged conduct which led them to leave their position.51 
However, an employee should, where practicable, use the grievance 
procedure; failure to do so in circumstances where it is reasonable 
to, will militate against a complainant. 
Recently in the UK, the Employment Appeals Tribunal in Abbey 
National Plc v Fairbrother ,52 considered the scope of constructive 
dismissal in the context of discrimination and the appropriate use of 
grievance procedures. The case is an authority for the proposition 
that conduct by an employer said to destroy the implied term of trust 
and confidence inherent in the employer/employee relationship (and 
so entitling the employee to resign and claim constructive dismissal) 
will not do so if the employer had reasonable and proper cause for 
the conduct in question. 
  
A claim for a trade dispute under the Industrial Relations Act 1969 
O’ Sullivan in his article on Preventing and Defending Stress and 
Bullying at Work Cases notes that there is a more unusual route for 
taking a bullying claim under the Industrial Relations Act 1969 . 
Section 9 of that Act provides that where there is a trade dispute as 
defined under the Industrial Relations Act 1946 , a case may be 
referred to the Rights Commission. The Rights Commissioner may 
make a recommendation, however his/her decision is not binding 
unless the employer agrees to be bound under s.20 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1969 .53 
 
 
Conclusion 
Having established that there are a variety of actionable causes for 
cases involving bullying, stress and harassment, and having 
demonstrated how the law in this field has evolved in tandem with 
existing common law rules and statutory provisions, it is fair to say 
that the existing laws have been used by litigants to seek redress in 
the absence of dedicated legislation. The concluding part of this 
article will examine how the courts in the UK and Ireland have dealt 
with the emergence of the tortious claims for psychiatric injuries 
relating to bullying, stress and harassment cases. Furthermore, the 
author will examine in light of recent developments, whether it is 
desirable to consolidate and codify employment rights law in order 
to provide clarity to prospective litigants. Finally, the author will 
argue that if codification is required, then this will necessitate a 
change in the nature of present jurisdictions for bringing claims 
involving bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace.54 
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